

NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Establishment of the DCI Committee on Compartmentation

1. This memorandum establishes the DCI Committee on Special Access Programs to continue the work of the APEX Steering Group, which is disestablished. The committee will be composed of representatives of the Community organizations currently having responsibilities pertaining to compartmented intelligence. I am also continuing the current position of Special Assistant to the DCI for Compartmentation (SA/DCI/C) who will chair the committee. He will be supported by a small Compartmentation Control Staff. I am assuming that the National Security Council will, at my request, revoke PD/NSC-55, dated 10 January 1980.

2. I intend to use these organizations to assist in fulfilling my responsibilities under Section 4-2 of E.O. 12065 for the oversight and management of special access programs. My approach to these responsibilities will be to:

a. introduce rational parallel procedures among the existing special access programs;

b. recommend and implement such actions regarding special access programs as I determine with NFIB consultation to be in the best interests of the Intelligence Community.

3. I expect that the administration of special access program policies, guidelines, and procedures will continue to be carried out by relevant DCI Committees in concert with the Compartmentation Control Staff. This staff shall have representatives from several members of the Community.

4. I direct that [] will continue to serve as the Special Assistant to the DCI for Compartmentation. [] will serve as his deputy.

William J. Casey
Chairman

7 January 1981

SALVAGE LIST #1

ACTIONS REQUIRING CONTINUING SUPPORT AND ATTENTION FOR SCI DURING TRANSITION

- A. Reaffirm support to fund and build a Community-wide Special Access Registry (4C);
- B. Continue expansion of decompartmentation of imagery; how far to expand is a current APEX issue;
- C. Continue process of decompartmentation of ELINT;
- D. Continue the process, primarily by NSA, of easing the process and increasing the volume of sanitized or sanitizable COMINT;
- E. Replace existing SCI security oath (Form 4066) with a single community-wide, contractual nondisclosure agreement (current APEX issue);
- F. Finish redrafting of imagery, COMINT and ELINT user manuals to exclude operational information and restrict or withdraw old manuals (identified in the APEX Steering Group inventory) that include operational information;
- G. Resolution of APEX issues dealing with:
 - (1) Prohibition against compartmenting codewords;
 - (2) Minimal classification of materials describing and explaining SCI channels;
 - (3) General accesses to SCI (as opposed to specific project or product accesses) for secretaries, registry personnel, librarians, etc.
- H. Promulgation of policy to exclude operational information from Finished Intelligence;
- I. Reaffirm effort to apply with uniformity common SCI physical and personnel security and document handling procedures. This includes common clearance forms and mutual acceptance of access approvals. A single security policy manual could follow. (Current APEX issue.)
- J. Establish an effort to rewrite information accountability rules of E.O. 12065 to accommodate high-technology, high-volume, time-sensitive, electrically processed and disseminated collection system materials, especially, products.

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